Hate is a significant source of violence and trouble in the world. Hate is a stable emotional pattern marked by severely negative feelings toward some person or group. Many people come to hate specific other people whom they believe have mistreated them in some way. Other people have long-standing hatred even of people they have never met, simply on the basis of belonging to groups in conflict. This would be bad enough if the emotional states were the end of it, but all too often these feelings result in violent acts. During the 20th century, these feelings sometimes contributed to large-scale mass killings, in Armenia, in Germany, in the Soviet Union, in Cambodia, in Rwanda, in Yugoslavia, in China, and elsewhere (although hate was certainly not the only cause of those horrific acts).

In recent years, social scientists have devoted much empirical attention to understanding why people act and behave aggressively toward others, with comparatively less attention given to understanding why people hate. Although there have been many scholarly advances in the domain of aggression, the domain of hate remains largely enigmatic and lacking a strong empirical foundation. In light of the absence of much empirical work...
concerning hate, our analysis of hate draws on the extant research in aggression and prejudice, with the intent of applying these relevant findings to the understanding of hate.

Because hate is often linked to violence, our approach to hate starts with the four roots of violent and evil acts proposed by Baumeister (1997). To be sure, not all violence is motivated by hate. But the sources of violence offer a starting point for considering the roots of hate. The four roots proposed in that earlier work are as follows. First, instrumental and pragmatic concerns sometimes prompt people to resort to violence to get their way. Second, some people turn violent when their favorable images of themselves are attacked or threatened. Third, some violence is motivated by idealistic pursuits and goals, such as when people believe that violent means will make the world a better place. And fourth, a small amount of violence is driven by sadism, which is to say that some people get pleasure and satisfaction out of inflicting violence on others.

INSTRUMENTAL AGGRESSION

A great deal of aggression is simply a means to an end. Some people use it to win arguments or get their way in disputes. Others use it to pursue goals that are widely seen as acceptable (even though the violent means are not acceptable): money, sex, power. Aggressive tendencies probably evolved because social life presents endless possibilities for conflict and dispute and because aggression is one way for certain animals to influence others and get what they want.

In that respect, the expected payoff serves as the motivation for people to commit aggressive acts toward others. People who engage in instrumental aggression are motivated by a desire for a reward, which does not entail any wish to harm or a hatred of others. If they could obtain the same goals by not aggressing toward others, instrumental aggressors would be expected to do so (Baumeister, 1997). Thus, it is the desire to reap personal benefits that attracts an instrumental aggressor to a victim, not a desire to inflict harm on that victim. People can commit instrumental acts of aggression without hating the victim and, in some instances (e.g., robberies and murders), without even knowing the identity of their victim.

Then again, if two individuals or two groups repeatedly come into conflict, hate may well develop. Repeated conflicts establish the two parties as chronic enemies. Once an enemy has been identified and the pattern of repeated conflict has given some basis to expect further conflicts in the future, negative feelings could well develop.

One implication of competing for scarce resources is that it naturally creates in-group and out-groups. For example, people who pose an obstacle to attaining desired resources (i.e., other competitors) constitute an out-group in relationship to another group who is competing for the same resources. Forming groups and differentiating between who belongs in an in-group and an out-group is seemingly natural and universal. In the context of competition for resources, ensuring that an in-group succeeds and gains the desired resources is also natural. Indeed, the finding that people favor in-groups is widely cited in the psychological literature (e.g., Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002; Tajfel & Billig, 1974).

We said that there is no inherent reason for the aggressor to hate his or her victim if the motive for aggression is instrumental. In that respect, instrumental aggression might not be accompanied by hate. However, instrumental violence may well foster hate in the victim. The person who is unjustly deprived of material or other assets would understandably feel angry, hostile, and resentful toward the aggressor, and over time (especially if there are repeated incidents) these could harden into hate.

The view of instrumentally aggressive victimization as a cause of hate leads to two predictions that could be tested empirically. First, when two people or two groups find themselves in a relationship in which one is generally the aggressor and the other the victim, the ensuing development of hate should be more pronounced in the chronic victim than in the chronic aggressor. That is, if one group regularly uses aggression to exploit another or appropriate its resources, then the exploiting group may not have to hate its victims, but the victim group may come to hate its oppressors.

If victim groups come to hate their oppressors, this pattern might be expected in the attitudes of Blacks toward Whites, insofar as Whites have historically oppressed and exploited Blacks. That is, Blacks may hold more negative attitudes toward Whites than Whites hold toward Blacks. To be sure, little empirical work has investigated the attitudes of victim and oppressor groups toward each other. However, Judd, Park, Ryan, Brauer, and Kraus (1993) examined the perceptions that Whites have of Blacks and the perceptions that Blacks have of Whites. They found that Blacks judged Whites more stereotypically than they judged their own in-group. There was little difference between how Whites rated their in-group and how they rated Blacks. Although Blacks showed patterns of ethnocentrism, this pattern was not found for Whites.

Although negative views of other groups do not necessarily translate into hate toward members of that group, recent work suggests that people belonging to low-status groups may come to hate oppressor groups if they have been treated with prejudice. Participants in a study by Tiopp (2003) were told that they would be taking part in an experiment on communication styles among over- and underestimators, a trait they were further told was an important determinant of behavior. All participants were assigned to the underestimator group, and devalued group status was manipulated by telling group members that people belonging to the overestimator group (of which none of the participants was a part) are generally perceived more...
positively in society. Next, participants were told they would interact with an overestimator who was a confederate to the study. Some participants then heard the confederate make a prejudiced comment (the confederate asked the experimenter to switch partners because he or she preferred not to interact with an underestimator). Other participants just heard the confederate make a neutral comment. Tropp found that participants in the prejudice condition reported feeling more hostile than participants in the neutral condition. In addition, participants in the prejudice condition were less positive about interacting with their partner. The important finding from this study was that being a victim of prejudice led to feelings of hostility toward the perpetrator of prejudice. Thus, members of low-status groups may come to hate dominant group members if they perceive that they were the victims of prejudice.

There is other evidence that corroborates the idea that victim groups may come to hate their oppressors. Brauncombe and Warr (1994) demonstrated that when a group identity is threatened, the dominant group that represents a threat to the minority group is then derogated. Further, Brauncombe, Schmitt, and Harvey (1999) showed that attributions to prejudice among Blacks lead to both increased hostility toward Whites and to greater minority group identification. Consistent with the idea that Blacks may develop hate toward Whites because Blacks have historically been the victims of prejudice, Blaunth and Spicer (2000) examined essays written by White and Black undergraduates about attitudes toward the other group. Whereas the essays written by White participants revealed themes consistent with modern racism (e.g., that Blacks get more than they deserve), the essays for Black participants revealed themes suggesting that their negative attitudes toward Whites are rooted in perceived prejudice and discrimination. Taken together, these findings suggest that people who are the victims of prejudice may foster hate toward the perpetrators of such prejudice.

Hate crime statistics also support the idea that victim groups may come to hate their oppressors. According to U.S. Department of Justice FBI hate crime statistics for 2002, 61.8% of all hate crime offenders were White, whereas 21.8% were Black. In that sense, White people commit over three times as many hate crimes as Blacks, but the preponderance of White hate crimes must be understood in the context of different population sizes. Population projections for 2002 from the U.S. Census Bureau estimate that White people account for 80.6% of the U.S. population and Black people for 12.7%. Thus, Black people commit more hate crimes against Whites relative to their representation in the population.

The need for resources to sustain life or enhance the quality of life may lead to instrumental aggression if aggressing toward competitors increases the chances that an aggressor will become the victor.

In summary, the concept of instrumental aggression suggests that acts of aggression against an out-group can be motivated by a desire to obtain rewards for the in-group. Hating or disliking an out-group member is not necessarily part of an instrumental aggressor's motivations, though it may be appealing as a way to rationalize one's exploitation, and moreover losers in instrumental conflicts may develop hate toward those they believe have unjustifiably exploited or oppressed them. From an evolutionary perspective, the need to procure resources to sustain life or enhance the quality of life may lead to instrumental aggression if aggressing toward competitors increases the chances that an aggressor will become the victor.

Instrumental aggression also naturally creates groups comprising people who will benefit from the fulfillment of rewards (i.e., the aggressors) and groups comprising people who perceive a threat to fulfillment of rewards (i.e., the competitors). The basic and universal nature of division into groups is also a theme common to the domain of prejudice, where encounters with out-group members may lead to automatic attitudes and prejudice responses.
THREATENED EGOISM

Aggression may also serve as a means for some people to get even with others who pose a threat to or challenge their positive self-views. For people who think very highly of themselves, receiving information that compromises this positive self-view could be damaging to their self-concept if they were to accept it as true. Thus, people may latch onto the perceived source of the negative evaluation, in doing so refuting the evaluation and asserting symbolic dominance over the other person (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996).

Appraisals of the self that are favorable, along with the desire to receive such favorable self-evaluations, constitute egotism. Egotism is defined as a motivational investment in maintaining a favorable global evaluation of the self (Baumeister et al., 1996). Aggression may stem from one’s having high self-regard and suffering a blow to one’s ego. It is posited that ego threats lead to negative affect, which may become directed outward toward others. The need to boost self-esteem after incurring an ego threat may serve as a potential motivation for prejudice and hate toward out-group members.

The idea that low self-esteem causes violence and aggression has been a long-standing tradition in the psychological literature. For example, in their book on hate crimes, Levin and McDevitt (1993) discussed low self-esteem as a cause of aggression and hate crimes. Toch (1969/1993) suggested that violence may serve as a means to boost people’s low self-esteem. In his studies attempting to link men to violence, however, he was unable to demonstrate that low self-esteem led to violence. In fact, Toch presented evidence that casts doubt on this claim and seemingly bolsters the idea that high self-esteem may lead to violence. He referred to violent men as having “exaggerated self-esteem” and as demanding “unwarranted respect” (p. 136). Elsewhere it has been asserted that terrorists (Long, 1990), murderers (Kirschner, 1992), and Black violent criminals (Scheffelden, 1988) commit crimes as a result of low self-esteem. Indeed, the array of out-groups for which low self-esteem has been linked to aggression and violence is seemingly credible evidence that a link between low self-esteem and aggression should exist.

This link tying low self-esteem to negative outcomes, however, may not be as clear-cut as thought by some. From a Freudian perspective, it was plausible that people who felt bad about themselves might have displaced this negative self-directed affect onto others. Therefore, in terms of theorizing regarding hate, it would seem plausible that those low in self-esteem might be likely to hate others and that low self-esteem would be one cause of hate, both of the self and of others. However, if this were true, there should be data to support either one or both of the following patterns. First, there should be evidence that groups known to have low self-esteem also have higher crime rates. Second, it might be expected that groups with higher crime rates should also have low self-esteem.

The data, however, consistently point toward the opposite conclusions, namely that groups with lower self-esteem are generally less violent (and vice versa). Women have been found to have lower self-esteem than men (e.g., Kling, Hyde, Showers, & Buswell, 1999), but they are not more violent and in fact are far less likely to commit crimes or other acts of violence (except in the domestic sphere; see Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985; see also Archer, 2000). Depressed people are also known to have low self-esteem (e.g., Allgod-Meren, Lewinsohn, & Hops, 1990; G. W. Brown & Harris, 1978; Tennen & Herberger, 1987), but a link has been found only between depression and family violence. Violence directed toward others does not appear to stem from people suffering from depression.

It might also be expected that members of groups who have higher rates of crime and violence should have lower self-esteem. Thus, examining the self-esteem of groups with higher crime rates may also shed some light on the tentative link between self-esteem and violence. Hare (1993) showed that psychopaths tend to have very positive or narcissistic self-views but also have egos that are susceptible to insults. Crocker and Major (1989) demonstrated that Black people do not have lower self-esteem than do White people. On the contrary, self-esteem among Black people is generally found to be higher than among Whites (e.g., Gray Little & Hubalh, 2000; Teenage & Crocker, 2002). Attributing aggression and increased crime rates to having lower self-esteem may therefore be problematic in light of the data that show groups who have largely positive self-appraisals also have higher rates of violence.

The empirical evidence does not seem to fit the idea that low self-esteem directly leads to violence, nor does it suggest that the opposite is necessarily true—that high self-esteem leads to violence. Rather, as Baumeister et al. (1996) proposed, high self-esteem may interact with situational threats to one’s ego, which together may lead to violence and aggression. According to the threatened egotism theory, aggression and violence may arise in people who have positive self-views but receive negative appraisals from others. If the recipient of the negative appraisal rejects the evaluation as untrue, the appraisal from the other person may result in negative affect, aggression, and violence directed at the source of the negative evaluation (Baumeister et al., 1996).

Laboratory evidence has confirmed that threatened egotism leads to aggression. Bushman and Baumeister (1999) measured both self-esteem and narcissism. (Narcissism involves a highly favorable, even inflated self-view along with a motivation to have this favorable view of self confirmed by others.) Narcissists were more aggressive than anyone else when praised, but when they were criticized or insulted they became highly aggressive. Self-esteem alone did not predict aggression in either condition. Thus, the most egotistical persons were also the most aggressive, but only when...
their egos had come under attack. Moreover, they were aggressive only toward the person who had offended them; they did not displace these aggressive feelings toward innocent third parties.

In fact, people may be so willing to act negatively toward the person who insults their pride that they will also incur costs to themselves to carry out the retaliation, as first shown by B. R. Brown (1968). Participants in Brown’s experiment were all young men who were taking part in a game in which they owned a trucking company and could earn real money by driving their trucks down a stretch of road. One person, a confederate in the experiment, owned a portion of the road and could charge the other person, the participant, a toll for using that part of the road. The confederate exercised this opportunity often, causing the participant to lose a great deal of money in tolls. Taxing rules applied to the game, such that the more a person earned in tolls, the more he would have to pay in “road taxes.” Thus, charging low tolls was profitable, but high tolls incurred a cost to the person charging the toll in that he lost money through having to pay taxes. The only goal of the game was to earn money, which made it even clearer that charging large tolls to the other person would come at a huge cost to the person charging the large toll.

In this experiment, participants were in one of two conditions: people who did or did not incur ego threats. B. R. Brown (1968) delivered ego threats by telling participants that while they were playing the game they had been observed by an audience who was evaluating them. Some people were told that the audience thought that even though they had lost some money, they had played their part well. Others, those in the condition that led to ego threat, were told that the audience thought the confederate made them “look like a sucker” by charging the high tolls. Of particular interest was what those who had just been humiliated by the audience did next. In the next round, the roles were reversed, and the participant was given control of the toll road. Participants who were insulted charged the other person high tolls, even though this meant they were themselves losing money. In contrast, participants who were not insulted by the audience did not sock the other person with large tolls.

The results of this experiment demonstrate that people who experience insults to their pride may be willing to sacrifice personal gain to engage in revenge. That is, if people experience a blow to their ego, they might then be willing to go beyond revenge that is pragmatic. Pragmatic revenge would entail trying to win back money that was lost. However, as was seen in B. R. Brown’s experiment, people who received the unfavorable evaluation did not merely charge the other person a moderate amount so that they could win back money they lost in the first round. Instead, they socked the money they could have won and instead went about making sure the other person lost money. Although it would perhaps be premature to speak of “hate” between a participant and confederate in a one-shot laboratory experiment, the willingness to sacrifice one’s own money simply to hurt someone else suggests an intensity of irrational, negative feelings that could well be the beginning of a hating relationship if the interactions were to continue in that vein.

It should also be noted that threatened egos may not lead directly to aggression. Rather, there is an intermediate step that should be considered. This is, threatened egos are likely to result in negative affect, which then should be directly associated with aggression and violence. The direction of this negative affect, whether it is directed inward toward the self or outward toward others, is poised to be decided at the point when the person either accepts or rejects the threat. If a person were to accept an insult from another person as true, he or she might then experience negative self-directed affect, which would likely lead to withdrawal. However, if a person were to reject the insult from the other person, lie or she might then experience negative other-directed affect, which would potentially lead to aggression or violence (Baumeister et al., 1996).

There could also be other situational factors that contribute to when people aggress toward others. For example, the stability of one’s self-esteem may be a relevant factor to weigh when determining whether high self-esteem will lead to aggression. Kernis, Gruenemann, and Barclay (1989) found that people whose self-esteem was high but changed from day to day (i.e., was unstable) were more likely than those whose self-esteem was high but stable to report negative affect toward others. Therefore, it is important to consider both the level of one’s self-esteem (high or low) and the stability (stable versus unstable) when determining who is likely to commit acts of aggression and violence.

To this point it has been discussed that ego threats may engender negative affect, and this may lead to aggression and violence toward others. The link between threatened egos and hate, however, may be clear if it is considered what people who suffer an ego threat may gain by hating others. One potential answer may be found in the prejudice and stereotyping literature, where it has been suggested that hate directed toward others in the wake of an ego threat may lead people to feel better about themselves. Hate, then, may serve a purpose to the perpetrator—it could make a person feel better about himself or herself when others threaten these positive self-views.

Fein and Spencer (1997) examined the need to bolster self-esteem and its implications for stereotypes. In their first study they used stereotypes of Jewish women (whom they called Jewish American princesses, or JAPs). They manipulated the need to bolster self-esteem by having some participants self-affirm by choosing several values important to their self-concept and then writing about why this one value was important to their self-concept. Participants in the no-affirmation condition were asked to choose the value that was least important to them and write about why this
value might be important to another person. Participants were then told that their job was to act as a manager of an organization and to evaluate a female job candidate's credentials, which were either stereotypically Jewish (i.e., containing references to Jewish organizations) or non-Jewish and accompanied by a photograph of a woman dressed either to look Jewish (e.g., wearing a Star of David) or to look non-Jewish. They found that people who had not self-affirmed evaluated the Jewish target more negatively, compared with the non-Jewish candidate and compared with people who had self-affirmed. Thus, the most negative feelings toward the target (certainly not hate, but at least hostile and prejudicial) came from the combination of lower feelings of self-esteem and evaluating an out-group member.

Fein and Spencer (1997) also conducted a study in which they measured state self-esteem at two time points: after the participants received either bogus positive or negative feedback about their intelligence and after they rated the female job candidate. The bogus intelligence test was important in that it provided a threat to the participant's ego. Fein and Spencer found that participants whose egos were threatened evaluated the Jewish candidate worse than if they thought she was not Jewish and if their egos had not been threatened. Also, participants who evaluated the Jewish candidate and received negative feedback experienced the greatest increase in state self-esteem from the time they received the feedback until after they evaluated the candidate. Fein and Spencer concluded that derogating the out-group member had positive implications for the evaluator. That is, evaluating the out-group member more negatively boosted the evaluator's own self-esteem. Put more bluntly, people's self-esteem was boosted by expressing hostile prejudice.

Receiving blows to one's ego has the potential to result in negative affect, as well as aggression and violence directed at the perceived source of the negative evaluation. This may be particularly true for people who think favorably of themselves, who have high self-esteem, or who are narcissistic. It has also been shown by B. R. Brown's study (1968) that people whose egos are threatened may even incur a cost to themselves to pay back the negative evaluation they have received. Though aggression may come at a price to people, they are willing to pay this price if others have insulted them—that is, if others are deserving of revenge.

Like instrumental aggression, hate has the potential to serve a purpose to the perpetrator. People may not merely commit acts of hate spontaneously but may be motivated by reasons relating to the self. This reason, to bolster self-esteem, may then lead people to derogate out-group members if by doing so they feel better about themselves.

People might also be motivated to commit acts of aggression or hate even if their egos have not been threatened. If people believe that acting aggressively toward others is done for the protection of the greater good or for the pursuit of collective high ideals, this may legitimize acting badly toward others. Though perpetrators of aggression may be committing a fair share of aggressive or violent deeds, if they are motivated by idealism they might come to believe that they are actually doing good.

**IDEALISM**

Idealism is another root of violence. Although many people associate violence with evil and regard perpetrators of evil as immoral, it is important to recognize that many perpetrators themselves regard their actions as pursuing or upholding positive moral values. In a war, for example, it is not uncommon for both sides to regard themselves as on the side of virtue and goodness and to perceive their enemies as evil.

It may be ironic that the pursuit of positive moral ideals can produce horrific violence and bloodshed, but the pattern is indisputable. If anything, idealistic violence produces greater carnage than any other type. Of all the violent crimes in the 20th century—by all accounts an exceptionally bloody century—the highest body counts were perpetrated in the name of high ideals. These included the utopian (communist) schemes that guided the Chinese Cultural Revolution and the Stalinist purges, both of which claimed over 20 million victims. The atrocious mass killings of Nazi Germany were also perpetrated in pursuit of a utopian dream of creating a society in which all the right people would supposedly live together in peace, harmony, and virtue. The Khmer Rouge in Cambodia killed nearly 2 million people out of a population of around 8 million, and they too sought to install an ideal society.

Such violence is not confined to the 20th century. An important prototype was the French Revolution and its Reign of Terror. The Committee of Public Safety, which presided over the terror, was explicitly devoted to installing a Reign of Virtue in France, but its legacy was memories of the guillotine and the seeming arbitrariness of injustice. It was an attempt to create a better society founded on philosophical thought and on the ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Yet it so discredited democracy that France soon welcomed back monarchy.

Hate is almost certainly a factor in idealistic violence. If God and goodness are on our side, then those who oppose us must have embraced the cause of evil, and therefore it is appropriate (perhaps even obligatory) to hate them. Any individual who lacks sufficient zeal in hating the devil suggests a deficit in one's love for God and goodness. For example, Conquest (1986) described how during the Ukrainian terror-famine of the 1930s, many low-level cadres took pity on the starving peasant families whose last scraps of food they were confiscating. Yet they reproached each other for showing mercy or even for feeling pity.
Idealistic structures particularly contribute to hate by legitimizing it. Animosity that arises from whatever root may be sustained and increased insofar as the legitimizing values and ideals justify it. People who might normally seek to curb their animosity toward some target may instead cultivate it when collectively held ideals designate it as appropriate.

Once again, research on prejudice provides some converging evidence. By most accounts, overt anti-Black prejudice in the United States declined precipitously in the 1960s, due in part to a cultural campaign that promoted ideals of racial equality and stigmatized prejudice as evil. However, some negative feelings toward Black citizens shifted into a new form. Kinder and Sears (1981) characterized the newly emerging form as symbolic racism, and they noted that it was rooted more in moral objections to the behavior of Black people than in traditional notions of White supremacy and innate racial differences. Thus, whereas early 20th-century racists had simply asserted that Black people were innately, genetically inferior to Whites, the new symbolic racists could assert that Black and White people were born equal but that some animosity toward Black people was justified on moral grounds. Black people were criticized for being excessively violent, for preferring to live off government subsidies and other handouts instead of working for a living, for sexual immorality and promiscuity, for paternal irresponsibility, and for other alleged moral deficiencies.

It is possible that some individuals embraced these "symbolically racist" (in Kinder and Sears's term, 1981) views out of a sincere belief that Black people were more prone than other races to perform immoral behaviors. For others, however, it seems likely that symbolic racism was merely a continuation of racial antagonism and even racial hatred, just on new terms. The new American ideal of racial equality made people uncomfortable in asserting that the races were innately or genetically different, but by citing moral ideals they could feel justified in retaining their antagonistic, hostile feelings. In plainer terms, it may have been simple for some people to shift from "I hate Black people because they are different" to "I hate Black people because they behave badly."

Centuries earlier, the Spanish Inquisition may have offered some people a similar opportunity to sustain and act on their petty personal hatreds by invoking high ideals (Roth, 1964). Jews and Christians had lived near each other relatively peacefully in Spain for some time. Jews were barred from many professions and opportunities, but they performed important socioeconomic functions, such as lending money. (Christians regarded charging interest as sinful, on the grounds that it meant profiting by time, and time belonged to God, but the ban on charging interest had the unintended effect of making it difficult to find anyone from whom one could borrow money.)

A rise in religious enthusiasm led to a royal decree that all Jews must either leave the country or convert to Christianity. The very short time frame made it impractical for most Jews to emigrate, so a great many accepted the Christian faith, at least in public oaths. This, however, had the unintended side effect that these new Christians found themselves freed from all the traditional barriers and restrictions that had held Jews back in society. Many of them therefore became immensely successful. This excited considerable envy and resentment among their neighbors, who grumbled that the forcible conversions had been intended as a way to promote the true faith (in their eyes) and not to enrich ex-Jews. These individuals cast about for some more acceptable basis for their animosity, finally settling on the complaint that some of the ostensible new Christians had been insincere about their conversion. The Inquisition grew out of this as a means of investigating whether these converts were sincere, genuine Christians or instead harbored Jewish (or other un-Christian) beliefs.

As Roth (1964) and others noted, it is likely that some people denounced others to the Inquisition out of a sincere desire to promote Christian faith and ideals, but others acted out of petty personal animosities. The Inquisition provided a structure of legitimized punishment that some people used as a way of justifying and acting on their personal hatreds.

Perhaps ironically, opposition to prejudice may fuel hate in today's America. This is because current American ideals condemn prejudice and therefore render it inappropriate to hold strongly negative views toward anyone who is seen as prejudiced or even as supporting prejudice. Probably the most hated intellectuals in America in recent years are the authors of The Bell Curve (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994), a book that purportedly documented a racial difference in intelligence. Many people condemned the book and its authors, even without reading it. It is not our intention to defend the book but simply to indicate that whereas once prejudice was a source of hate, now opposition to prejudice can fuel hate simply because of a shift in the collective ideals of the society.

SADISM

Sadism was the fourth root of evil Baumeister (1997) identified. Sadism refers to taking pleasure in inflicting pain and suffering on others. It is probably less common than the other roots but is nonetheless a genuine factor that contributes to some violent acts.

One could extrapolate from sadistic violence to hate insofar as some people may get pleasure from hating. There is, however, little reason to speculate that hating is directly satisfying. (It is theoretically plausible that people can get direct pleasure from inflicting harm on others.) It is generally assumed that most states of negative affect are inherently aversive, and this would presumably extend to hate as well. In that sense, it seems a priori unlikely that people could derive pleasure, joy, or other positive gratifications from hating. It is hard to rule out entirely, though. We raise this as an issue
for further research: Do some people garner direct satisfaction or pleasure from the act of hating someone else?

A perhaps more plausible link between sadism and hate is that hate may contribute to sadism. It does seem plausible that people may derive pleasure or satisfaction from inflicting harm on those they hate. For example, soldiers may experience a broad range of emotional reactions to killing an enemy in battle, but the more pleasant emotions would seemingly be more likely to the extent that the soldier hates the enemy.

**CONCLUSION**

In this chapter, we have sought to provide theoretical bases for understanding hate by looking for converging evidence from related phenomena, specifically aggression and prejudice. First, material, instrumental conflicts produce both aggression and prejudice, and we speculate that these may or may not contribute to hate as well. In particular, chronic victims of aggression and prejudice may come to hate those who they believe have victimized and oppressed them.

Second, threatened egotism gives rise to aggression and may contribute to prejudice as well, and it seems a very promising candidate as a source of hate. That is, people may come to hate those who threaten their self-esteem or otherwise impugn their favorable images of self.

Third, idealism contributes to both aggression and hate. Though idealism is often a positive force, its very positivity lends it power to justify and legitimize a wide range of actions, and it may also be used to legitimize hate, or even to make hating seem obligatory under some circumstances.

A fourth root of aggression, sadism, seemed less promising as a conceptual basis for hating. It also lacked the convergence of findings from the study of prejudice.

These considerations lead to the following conclusions. Hate may be prone to arise among people who feel that their self-esteem has been threatened, and in that case it would be mainly directed at the source of those threats. Hate may arise out of either material or idealistic conflicts. Hate could be intensified if idealism offers justification for hating or if losing a material conflict leads to resentment toward the winners of those conflicts.

**REFERENCES**


